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Below is a Wordle of a paper that I’m presenting at NA-CAP@IU 2009 next month:

The paper talks about semantic network representations as emergent cultural entities that are ontologically connected to larger cultural landscapes. I explore semantic networks from a Heideggerian existentialist and phenomenological perspective. I invoke cultural schema theory to bridge the syntactic and lexical elements to the semantic and conceptual dimensions of semantic network graphs and offers reasons why the viability of such graphs as they are currently constructed are insufficient for creating semantic interoperability for our information technologies.

Tags:conference paper, cultural schemas, culture, Heidegger, interoperability, semantics semantic networks
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I found this navigation sphere via Information Aesthetics. I like the interface a lot, but it’s not without its difficulties. It portrays a series of images in the shape of a sphere that are connected to each other with lines. Both the images and lines are clickable. Click on an image and it will play that particular TEDTalk. Click on a line and it rotates the sphere to focus the connected image.

The images and lines themselves are a bit overwhelming. It is difficult for me to garner any useful information about the particular talk simply from the image. I might be intrigued by the look of a particular person or image enough to click on it, but I go into it blind, not knowing if the content is going to be of interest. However, the clickable images and lines are not the only components of the interface.

The more important and useful part of the interface is an overlaid translucent panel. At the bottom of the panel is a menu for visual, info, nav, about, and “X” (to close). Visual is the default. It allows you to manipulate the interface–the radius of the sphere, whether you’re looking at the sphere from a vantage point inside it or outside, making the connecting line visible or invisible, and allowing for fullscreen mode. The Info panel is what I need when navigating the sphere. It contains the information about the TEDTalk in focus–the title, a short description, tags, and the URL. The Nav panel is even more interesting in that is provides a tagcloud to allow for browsing the TEDTalks. Clicking on a tag produces a list below the tagcloud of all videos tagged with it. About is the obligatory information panel about the interface itself–who created it (Bestiario), that the videos come from TEDtalks, and a one-sentence description of what it is. The only complaint I have is that it doesn’t include the time of the video in either the panel or the spherical interface.

I think it’s an effective way of integrating text, tags and graphical navigation interface. I think it’s intriguing because I just started on a project today that has me exploring visualizations that would facilitate intercultural understanding. For example, in situations where there is a humanitarian disaster and the NGOs, the military support personnel, and the indigenous communities must work together to provide aid, relief and assistance. Each comes to the disaster context with different goals, different ideas about how things should work, different perspectives on the geography, and different ways of approaching phenomena. What becomes salient for these diverse cultural groups when they view the same phenomenon? It’s more than simply a visualization of a common operating picture (COP). Culturally different people will look at the same picture, object, or phenomenon and derive very different meanings from it. How do I capture what they see, what is salient for them? That legitimizes their perspective and worldview regardless of whether it conforms to the dominant objectivist perspective? Moreover, how do I create a visualization that will lead to a common operational understanding, a step beyond the COP? Is this the fundamental problem with COPs? I think it’s very likely.

It’s an interesting problem. I know that what they see is dependent upon their intrapersonal schemas–the patterns of cognitive elements that are evoked upon continually encountering the world–which shape what qualities and dimensions of an entity or phenomenon achieve salience. In Heidegger’s words, what is ready-to-hand becomes present-to-hand. But there’s a difficulty with trying to craft a representation for such schemas and display them with machines. It’s an ontology problem. With a three-dimensional visualization, you need to define the x, y, and z axes. But the experience is emergent and defies strict categorization. The only way to understand the experience is phenomenologically, but the only way to represent it is categorically. But reducing things to categories results in decontextualization and loss of semantic information. How can the semantics be retained in the visualization and representation process?

This is my conceptual problem to grapple with over the next few days. I have to have a direction to go in by Thursday morning. So, I think the best course is to delineate some boundaries and parameters of what is possible versus what is desirable, to craft some scenarios to help contextualize the visualization requirements, and explore how I might make permeable the potential categorical boundaries that I might be forced to employ.

Tags:conceptualization, cultural schemas, ontology, phenomenology, schemas, TEDTalks visualization
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I’m in the midst of writing and revising my thesis proposal. It deals with the ontology of tags–ontology in the sense of being and what is. While perusing the internet for information sources speaking to the notion of tags and folksonomies (collections of tags), I ran across something new in Thomas Vander Wal’s blog, Off the Top. It is a short video of the ideas embedded in the talks he’s been giving recently about social networks. In it he explores the granularity of social networks and the overlapping connections that comprise them.

Though the vid is short, I found it interesting because it speaks to my ideas and understanding of culture, which is a type of social network I suppose. I wanted to post it here and get back to a more thorough explanation of it in relation to culture.

Granular Social Network from Thomas Vander Wal on Vimeo.

Tags:cultural schemas, culture, granularity, sharing social network
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Well, I set a date for defense of my dissertation proposal. It’ll be on June 12, 2008 at 9:00AM. I’ve got a few more weeks to refine and finish up the proposal. I want to get it to my committee members about four weeks prior.

So what’s my dissertation going to be about? The tentative title is The Ontology of Tags. It’s basically an exploration of the use of tags as representations of cultural schemas, which are the flexible and adaptable cognitive structures that comprise the conceptualizations of an ontology. I adopt a Heideggerian existentialist perspective on ontology, which is phenomenological rather than categorical.

The formal ontologies constructed for information systems today are based on a classical notion of ontology that consists of complex taxonomies comprised of categories and relationships between them. However, formal ontologies are problematic in that they simultaneously crystallize and decontextualize information, which in order to be meaningful must be adaptive in context. In trying to construct a correct taxonomical system, formal ontologies are focused on syntactic precision rather than meaningful exchange of information. It is not fair to claim that syntax is irrelevant, but the meaning we make of information is dependent upon more than its syntactic structure. The semantic content of information is dependent upon the context in which it exists. For true semantic interoperability to occur among diverse information systems, within or across domains, information must be contextualized.

The way to introduce this contextualization is through the notion of culture. Culture is a phenomenon that emerges through the interplay of intrapersonal cognitive structures (i.e., schemas) and the extrapersonal structures of the world. Culture shapes the way we conceptualize the entities and phenomena of the world of our experience. What I describe as culture, Heidegger describes as background, in which we are continually immersed as Dasein. We are always being-in-the-world. Moreover, we are always being-in-becoming, emerging into the world as it were.

My thesis is that ontologies are more properly conceptualized as cultural schemas (i.e., shared cognitive schemas) rather than taxonomical structures. Situating them as cultural schemas means that they are inherently flexible and adaptable. I believe we can create schematic or phenomenological ontologies for information systems using sets of tags and folksonomies, which can complement and supplement the formal ontologies that are developed by ontology engineers and information scientists.

So, that’s my thesis and proposal in a nutshell. Although I try to explain it as simply as I can, most people still have trouble grasping it. I consider myself very lucky to have a committee that gets it. And each brings a particular expertise to the committee that touches on the major components of my justification and research project. I’m really excited and looking forward to June 12th.

Tags:cultural schemas, culture, folksonomies, Heidegger, ontologies, ontology, semantics tags
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Al Gore did another TED Talk last month. He has a new slide show where he talks about the democracy crisis as a parallel to the climate crisis. He tasks us with a generational imperative. I think it’s brilliant. And I only hope that my research can be part of the solution to both crises.

Tags:climate crisis, cultural schemas, culture, democracy generational
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6th Internet Identity Workshop Coming Up :: Off the Top :: vanderwal.net

Discussions around persona (not the IA persona variety) and identity abound and the need for services that grasp these differences are worked through. The need for better understanding the incredible value the role of identity in tagging services has also been discussed here, which is something many services do not grasp and are doing a dis-service to the people who want to tag items in their own perspective and context to ease their own refinding of the object (Twine really needs a much better understanding of tagging as their automated tagging is incredibly poor and missing many tangents for understanding that need to be applied for full and proper understanding of the objects in their service).

As I began my research into computational ontologies, I immediately realized that the promise of interoperability that an ontology was supposed to provide was basically unachievable in its current manifestation. Ontology is the theory of being that has ancient roots in philosophy. Aristotle’s elements, for example, were used as a taxonomic system to describe the existence of things in the world. Ontology has been confused, in my opinion, for classification and categorization systems. And for many philosophers throughout the ages the assumption was that there was a single, objective universe that existed, with the implication that there was a single ontology that could be constructed to describe it. The Aristotelian tradition of classification has continued through the ages has spawned studies in the philosophy of language, and the study of meaning and reference. Language, however, is a symbolic reference system and its traditional primacy in ontology perpetuates the notion of ontology as a classification system. To describe a thing, however, is not to necessarily understand its being. But we are trapped by language because we are forced to use it to communicate with one another about the nature of being of things. Existentialist philosophy shows us one way out of this dilemma of being able to describe the being of entities and phenomena in the world without confusing that being with the categories that are used to describe it. Existentialist philosophy always spoke to me since I first began reading it as an undergraduate. It spurred in me an insatiable desire to understand how different peoples conceptualized the world and what they perceived to exist.

The assumption that different peoples had different conceptualizations of the world wasn’t necessarily a new one, but the very idea that “our” particular conceptualization of it wasn’t necessarily the “correct and objective one” was a radical notion born of the postmodern age. It is in this context that I first encountered existentialist philosophy. It leads me to a completely different conceptualization of ontology than has been traditionally understood. It also led Quine [1] to conceive of multiple domain ontologies in contrast to a single ontology shared by all.

Domain ontologies made sense. The ontological commitments made by physicists in terms of mass and energy were completely different than the conceptualizations of chemists or biologists had of mass and energy. As we developed our independent domain knowledge, our conceptualizations of the same or similar entities or phenomena became increasingly complex and varied from one another. Enter computers and the digitization of information, the digitization of these complex conceptualizations we wanted to share. What better way to share than to develop an ontology of the conceptual relationships of the information contained in the information system? The ontology would provide the structure for communicating our conceptualizations! It’ll be brilliant!

As I began to understand what computational ontologies were and how they were constructed. I saw that they were categorization systems–slightly more complex perhaps than a typical taxonomy, but still rigid and mistakenly confusing the description of the entity or phenomenon with its being. The idea that language can fully represent a conceptualization remains at the core of computational ontology development. Enter me and my radical Heideggerian and relativistic notions…

Ontology refers to the underlying conceptualization we have of phenomena in the universe, not the language employed in its description. What we perceive to exist is largely based on our cultural upbringing and training. We perceive what we are “culturally programmed” to perceive. This is true for national/ethnic cultural groupings as much as it is true for domain specialists who share a particular conceptualization. Ontology, therefore, is dependent upon culture, and just as there are many cultures there can also be many ontologies. Moreover, ontologies are cultural, they are the shared conceptualizations of a culture.

Creating logical formalisms to describe these cultural conceptualizations fails to account for the fact that culture is an emergent phenomenon. It emerges from the interplay of intrapersonal cognitive schemas and the extrapersonal structures of the world. Our shared cognitive (i.e., cultural) schemas are flexible and adaptable, allowing us flexibility in understanding and adaptability to context. Ontologies constructed as logical formalisms eliminate these essential qualities, crystallizing the conceptualization as a rigid definition and hierarchy of relationships, and decontextualizing it, thereby voiding it of its semantic content. How can we overcome these difficulties?

It seems obvious to me that ontologies are cultural schemas. We should construct them in such a way that reflects their nature. We need a connectionist element to our ontologies that allows for the flexibility and adaptation they exhibit as cultural schemas. Ontologies, from this perspective are more like folksonomies than logical formalisms.

Folksonomies are constructed with tags. They continue to grow and change, but are relatively stable over periods of time, just as cultural schemas are. Tags are individualized, but when aggregated into tag sets or tagclouds represent a cultural understanding of the entities and phenomena by a culture. Tags are lexical units that represent the entry points into the complex networks of conceptual associations that comprise our schemas, and hence our ontologies.

The difficulty with this notion is that an individual can have many cultural identities, many types of shared conceptualizations that would make the interpretation of a particular tag difficult. Without knowing the cultural identity of the person creating or offering that tag, we cannot know its semantic content. It remains decontextualized. Identity is an important element in understanding ontologies. For example, a single individual could tag a geographic space or entity as part of a geographic ontology. That individual may tag it “exciting” if he were a hunter, but he might also tag it “dangerous” if he is also a father. Hunter and father are two cultural identities of a single person. And knowing his cultural identities are essential to properly interpreting the tags he has created and added to the folksonomy.

Van der Wal is right. Identity is an important element in the study of tagging. The reason it is important is that it provides context for semantic understanding of the entity or phenomenon being tagged. One way to understand how and why it is important is by putting into the context of ontologies as cultural schemas, and recognizing that tags represent entry points into a complex network of conceptual associations but are not the conceptualizations themselves.

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[1] Quine, W. V. O. (1953) “On What There Is”, as reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper & Row.

Tags:cultural schemas, emergent, identity, ontologies, tagging tags
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Re-blogged from Autism and Understanding Others « Neuroanthropology

Amanda Baggs presents her own life and thoughts in her YouTube video, In My Language, her translation of how she is in a constant conversation with the world around her.  She is autistic and does not speak.  But she can type, and after three minutes showing her interacting with her environment, she uses computer technology to explain herself to us.

This is interesting to me because it provides a high contrast example of the difficulty of communication between cultures. It is difficult for many people, even academics, to grasp the idea that culture has a significant impact on what we perceive as real and existential. People from different cultures don’t see the same things, even when looking at the same entity. When walking through the Australian Outback, I come across a rock formation and I see it as a rock formation. When one of the indigenous persons of the area come across that same rock formation, they see it as Krantjirinja, their Kangaroo Ancestor. It’s not a “different interpretation” or differing “social constructions” that apply different words to the same entity. They are not the same entities.

Such is the case with Amanda Baggs. She perceives a completely different world, understands and communicates with and within it in completely different ways than non-autistic persons. Not understanding what she experiences during the first three minutes of the video–having no reference system with which to understand it–makes it frustrating for those of us who are used to a particular form of cultural interaction. If we give in to our frustration, we dismiss Amanda and pass up an opportunity to expand our cognitive horizons and understanding of the world (and the autistic persons in it). Amanda’s video is an extreme example, but we often don’t invest enough time to understand before dismissing people from other cultures or simply assuming that they see what we see.

The problem is the same for computational systems, especially across domains. Creating a “specification of a conceptualization” will never be able to address the issue of seeing completely different things, even if it is machine-readable. It’s difficult enough to construct an ontology for a single domain, but trying to do it across domains requires a completely different approach. Machine-readable specifications just wont’ cut it. It’s like trying to give a dictionary or a glossary to someone and telling them to learn to speak another language.

This is why I advocate for the introduction of culture into the study of ontologies in computational systems. Ontology is, after all, a philosophia prima that examines the notion of Being, explores the nature of existence and tries to describe what exists. But there are many ways to understand the nature of existence, and culture is the primary force in shaping our understanding of it. So if we are to be successful in developing ontologies for our information systems, we will have to incorporate an understanding of the culture that uses the technology and the information within the system. Only then will we be able to see what members of other cultures see and be able to translate information meaningfully.

Tags:cultural schemas, culture, ontology, perception, semantics understanding
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The cultural schemas we share include the meaning we make of spatial relationships.  Scale is an important factor in the way we cognize space. Scale becomes an element of our spatial schemas, which are closely linked to other cognitive and cultural schemas within our neural networks. Put another way, resolution and experience are important factors in perception.

Interpreting hybrid images « Neurophilosophy
This experiment showed the importance of scale information in perception. The researchers specifically manipulated the spatial resolution of the painting that is, the periodicity with which image intensity changes. Large scale features change little over a given distance, and therefore have a low spatial resolution, while fine-grained features change much more over the same distance, and so have a high spatial resolution. In a second experiment, the participants were shown random noise patterns before the cropped greyscale painting. One group was shown a pattern with a high spatial resolution, the other a pattern with a low spatial resolution. Afterwards, the former reported seeing the bust of Voltaire, while the latter reported seeing the nuns. This showed that previous experience is an important factor in perception. The participants had selectively perceived the frequency channels presented to them before they viewed the image.

Tags:cognition, cultural schemas, geospatial, neural networks, neurophilosophy, perception spatial
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[This is not meant to be a well-written, coherent essay. Rather, it is simply my reflections of some of the concepts discussed in: Uschold, M. (2003) Where Are the Semantics in the Semantic Web? AI Magazine 24(3): 25-36.]

Talking about an agent’s ontology, Uschold says:

If it were written only for people to understand, this specification could be a glossary.

It is a simple statement that belies the complexity of human cognition and its ability to function as a connectionist network. Humans are able to read a word and its definition and recall a complex of associations and experiences to create meaning, to understand its semantic content and the ontological commitments that are shared within a community. An agent doesn’t have this ability and must rely on explicit specifications (ala Gruber) and formal languages to communicate its meaning to other agents. Successful communication is the goal, but machines are confronted with heterogeneous sources, “different ontology representation languages, different modeling styles, and an inconsistent use of terminology.”

Uschold describes the semantic continuum:

Semantics can be implicit, existing only in the minds of the humans who communicate and build web applications. They can also be explicit and informal, or they can be formal. The further I move along the continuum, the less ambiguity there is, and the more likely it is to have interoperable, robust, and correctly functioning web applications.

The difficulty with implicit semantics is their inherent ambiguity. People don’t always agree about the meaning of a term. Yet this is exactly where people live, so to speak. Humans engage in dialogue and discourse in order to clarify meaning. Through this interaction, we make the implicit semantics explicit. Engaging with machines isn’t as interactive, typically. We don’t expect our machines to be intelligent in terms of understanding semantic content and to be able to express that understanding as humans do. We also don’t expect that machines will be able to assess contextual cues that we use as humans to make meaning of our interactions with others, nor do we expect machines to remember our previous interactions with them (unless we explicitly encode that into the preferences of each particular application or service).

As Uschold continues to describe the continuum, moving towards the more formally expressed semantics for machine processing, it occurs to me that what we are doing is conforming our natural ways of interacting to the requirements of a machine. Why are we not trying to make the machine conform to our natural way of doing things? Shouldn’t the goal be to enable the machine to dynamically discover the meaning of content and how to use it? This, as it turns out, is what Uschold tackles next, machine-proccessible semantics:

For a computer to automatically determine the intended meaning of a given term in an ontology is an impossible task, in principle; it would require seeing into the mind of the author. Therefore, a computer cannot determine whether the intended meaning of two terms is the same.

Getting an agent to understand semantic content can be accomplished by hardwiring the meaning of terms and procedures into them, or through accessing external, publicly agreed to declarations such as ontologies. The heterogeneity of information and meaning makes both of these strategies limited. Information from different web sites may need to be integrated, so we require some way to map the different meanings to each other. Ontologies in conjunction with semantic mapping and translation techniques play a key role in semantic integration (Uschold citing Bradshaw et al. 2003).

Uschold speaks of human consensus regarding the use of terms. He refers to this consensus as an implicit shared semantic repository. I use the term cultural schemas to refer to this shared cognitive “repository.”

So, where are the semantics in the semantic web? Uschold offers these six explanations:

1. They are often just in the human-as-unstated assumptions derived from implicit consensus (e.g., price on a travle or bookseller web site).
2. They are informal specification documents, e.g., the semantics of UML or RDF SCHEMA.
3. They are hardwired in implemented code (e.g., in UML and RDF tools and in web shopping agents).
4. They are in formal specifications to help humans understand or write code (e.g., a modal logic specification of meaning of inform in an agent communication language).
5. They are formally encoded for machine processing, (e.g., fuel-pump has (superclasses SHO: pump)).
6. They are in the axiomatic and model-theoretic semantics of representation languages (e.g., the formal semantics of RDF).

Tags:cognition, concepts, cultural schemas, formal ontology, information, language, ontologies, semantics semantic web
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I first posted this in Bwebwenato. The discussion of graduate students and their perspectives on life and scholarship has been a frequently recurring one in the last weeks. I figured it was time to reflect upon it again.

My friend, Mark, who has been living in Uganda, recently sent me an excerpt from a magazine article. The excerpt really spoke to me, as I’m sure it did to Mark, because of the intensity of my experiences as an expatriate. It also reflects the good headspace I’m in right now, even as I adjust to a new, pressure-filled environment of graduate student life. I’ve been where many of these budding scholars haven’t, and have yet to be. I’m proud of that experience.

In November 2005, MEN’S JOURAL featured a list of the “60 Things A Man Must Do in His Lifetime.” Among them was “Become an Expat” by Bob Shacochis, which seems to have application to us all:

“When you teach grad students, those brainy, dreamy, slack-ass selves who have been squeezed through the educational intestine into the relatively expansive bowel of never-ending higher education, you have a recurring thought each time you enter a seminar room and scan the robust, nascently cynical faces of the whatever generation horseshoed around the table, receptive to the morsels of your wisdom: When are you guys ever going to get the fuck out of here?

“And I don’t mean finish the degree, get a job, a life. I mean turn your life upside down, expose it, raw, to the muddle. ‘Put out,’ as the New Testament (Luke 5:4) would have it, ‘into deep water.’ A headline in the New York Times on gardening delivers the same marching orders: IF A PLANT’S ROOTS ARE TOO TIGHT, REPOT. Go among strangers in strange lands. Sniff, lick, and swallow the mysteries. Learn to say clearly in an unpronounceable language, ‘Please, I very much need a toilet. A doctor. Change for a 500,000 note. I very much need a friend.’

“If you want to know a man, the proverb goes, travel with him. If you want to know yourself, travel alone. If you want to know your own home, your own country, go make a home in another country (not Canada, England, or most of Western Europe.) Stop at a crossroads where the light is surreal, nothing is familiar, the air smells like a nameless spice, and the vibes are just plain alien, and stay long enough to truly be there. Become an expatriate, a victim of self-inflicted exile for a year or two.

“Sink into an otherness that reflects a reverse image of yourself, wherein lies your identity, or lack of one. Teach English in Japan, aquaculture in the South Pacific, accounting in Brazil. Join the Peace Corps, work in the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, set up a fishing camp on the beach of Uruguay, become a foreign correspondent, study architecture in Istanbul, sell cigarettes in China.

“And here’s the point: Amid the fun, the risk, the discomfort, the seduction and sex in a fog of miscommunication, the servants and thieves, the food, the disease, your new friends and enemies, the grand dance between romance and disillusionment, you’ll find out a few things you thought you knew but didn’t.

“You’ll learn to engage the world, not fear it, or at least not to be paralyzed by your fear of it. You’ll find out, to your surprise, how American you are — 100-percent, and you can never be anything but –and that is worth knowing. You’ll discover that going native is self-deluding, a type of perversion. Whatever gender or race you are, you’ll find out how much you are eternally hated and conditionally loved and thoroughly envied, based on the evidence of your passport.

“You’ll find out what you need to know to be an honest citizen of your own country, patriotic or not, partisan or nonpartisan, active or passive. And you’ll understand in your survivor’s heart that it’s best not to worry too much about making the world better. Worry about not making it worse.

“When you come back home, it’s never quite all the way, and only your dog will recognize you.”

Tags:cultural schemas, culture, perception values
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